Abstract. Let G be an arbitrary cyclic group with generator g and order jGj with known factorization. G could be the subgroup generated by g within a larger group H. Based on an assumption about the existence of smooth numbers in short intervals, we prove that breaking the Di eHellman protocol for G and base g is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in G to the base g when a certain side information string S of length 2 log jGj is given, where S depends only on jGj but not on the de nition of G and appears to be of no help for computing discrete logarithms in G. If every prime factor p of jGj is such that one of a list of expressions in p, including p ? 1 and p + 1, is smooth for an appropriate smoothness bound, then S can e ciently be constructed and therefore breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms.
Introduction
Two challenging open problems in cryptography are to prove or disprove that breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol 5] is computationally equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in the underlying group and that breaking the RSA system 17] is computationally equivalent to factoring the modulus. In this paper we take a signi cant step towards the solution of the rst of these problems.
Let H be a nite group (written multiplicatively), and for g 2 H, let G = hgi be the cyclic subgroup generated by g. The discrete logarithm problem for the group H (or G) can be stated as follows: Given g and a 2 G, nd the unique integer x in the interval 0; jGj ?1] such that g x = a, where x is called the discrete logarithm of a to the base g. The discrete logarithm problem is sometimes also de ned as the generally easier problem of nding any x satisfying g x = a, but if jGj is known then the two problems are equivalent.
line where Alice and Bob authenticate each other by speaker recognition) to generate a mutual secret key which is computationally infeasible to determine for a passive eavesdropper overhearing the entire conversation between Alice and Bob.
The protocol works as follows. Let G = hgi be a cyclic group generated by g for which the discrete logarithm problem is computationally infeasible. (It should be pointed out that it is unknown whether such a group exists.) Speci c groups that have been proposed for application in this protocol are the multiplicative groups of large nite elds (prime elds 5] or extension elds), the multiplicative group of residues modulo a composite number 10, 11] , elliptic curves over nite elds, the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve over a nite eld and the class group of imaginary quadratic elds 2].
In order to generate a mutual secret key, Alice and Bob secretly choose integers x A and x B , respectively, at random from the interval 0; jGj ? 1]. Then they compute secretly y A = g xA and y B = g xB , respectively, and exchange these group elements over the insecure public channel. Finally, they compute z AB = y xA B = g xAxB and z BA = y xB A = g xBxA , respectively. Note that z AB = z BA , and hence this quantity can be used as a secret key shared by Alice and Bob. More precisely, they need to apply a function mapping elements of G to the key space of a cryptosystem. In contrast to digital signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem (e.g., 6], 19]), it is not required for the Di e-Hellman protocol that the order of the group be known. In this case, x A and x B are chosen from a su ciently large interval. In fact, it has been pointed out (e.g., see 11] ) that using groups with unknown order may be advantageous, and the non-interactive public-key scheme of 10] relies crucially on the fact that the group order is unknown.
Computing discrete logarithms and breaking the Di eHellman protocol
An eavesdropper knowing y A and y B can in principle compute z AB by computing the discrete logarithm x A of y A to the base g and then computing z AB = y xA B . It is unknown in general whether there exists a faster method for computing z AB from y A and y B . This paper investigates the relation between the two problems. More precisely, we investigate in which cases an e cient subroutine breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol for the group G and base g could be used for computing discrete logarithms to the base g in G.
De nition 1. A Di e-Hellman oracle (DH-oracle for short) for a group G with generator g takes as inputs two elements a; b 2 G (where a = g x and b = g y ) and returns the element g xy .
A DH-oracle hence allows to multiply two logarithms without knowing them explicitly but also without receiving the result explicitly. For instance, when given g x but not x one can use the oracle to compute g (x  2 ) , and more generally g P(x) for any polynomial P with integer coe cients. Multiplications and additions in the exponent are performed by using the oracle and the normal group multiplication, respectively. . Our proof techniques will exploit these facts.
When proving a reduction of a problem A to another problem B it is important to state precisely what type of instances of B are generated by the reduction process. If, in the process of solving problem A, the instances of problem B that need to be solved are very special, then the reduction from A to B is not satisfactory because it is conceivable that these special instances are easy to solve even if the general problem B is nevertheless infeasible. This problem is one of the reasons for the limited applicability to cryptography of the theory of NPcompleteness. One can show that this problem does not arise in our case because a Di e-Hellman oracle that answers correctly for a fraction of the inputs can be transformed into a uniform Di e-Hellman oracle.
We are only interested in groups G for which the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be intractable. The fastest algorithm for general groups, which is attributed to Shanks and referred to as the baby-step giant-step algorithm, runs in time O( p n log n) and requires space O( p n), where n is a known upper bound on jGj. If jGj is known, an algorithm of Pollard with essentially the same running time but almost no space requirement can be used. However, its running time has not been proven rigorously. Furthermore, it is well-known 15] that for an arbitrary group G, discrete logarithms can be computed in time O( p q) where q is the largest prime factor of the order jGj of G. For certain speci c groups, such as the multiplicative group modulo p, there exist algorithms which run much faster than the generic algorithms. We refer to 12] for a detailed discussion of the discrete logarithm problem and algorithms for solving it.
The rst published result on the equivalence between computing discrete logarithms and breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol is due to den Boer 4] . He proved the equivalence for the group Z q when q is a prime such that '(q?1) has only small prime factors. In order to avoid any confusion it should be pointed out that this is not equivalent to the condition that q ? 1 be smooth, and that no e cient discrete logarithm algorithm is known for Z q for primes q of the described special form. In the following we give a generalized description of den Boer's idea which will serve as an introductory example for our proof technique.
For simplicity, assume that G is a group with prime order jGj = p where p ? 1 = Q r j=1 q j with q j B for all j for some smoothness bound B, where the q j 's are pairwise relatively prime. The arguments can easily be generalized to arbitrary groups with known factorization of the group order, which also need not be square-free if a DH-oracle for subgroups of G is also available. The group G can be arbitrary, for instance a subgroup of a multiplicative group modulo a larger prime (as suggested in 19] and in the recent NIST proposal for a digital signature standard), or an elliptic curve. Let a = g x be given. The case x = 0 is easily detected because in this case a is simply the neutral element of G. Let = log B) group operations. For any u < B (e.g., u = p B), a baby-step giant-step-type time-memory tradeo allows to reduce the number of group operations by a factor u at the expense of increasing the number of calls to the DH-oracle by a factor u and further requiring a table of size u, which must also be sorted.
Towards an equivalence proof for all groups
The arguments of the previous section only apply to groups G for which every large prime factor p of jGj occurs only once and is of the special form that p ? 1 is smooth with respect to a small bound B. Although no DL-algorithm is known for groups of this type that is faster than for general groups of the same size, it appears to be questionable whether it is secure to use such groups only for the bene t of being able to prove the equivalence.
In this section we present a proof technique that applies to any group G. It (1) In the (generally unlikely) case that the square of a large prime p i divides jGj (i.e., e i > 1), one needs a DH-oracle not only for the group G with generator g but also for subgroups of G of the form hg p z i i, for z = 1; : : : ; e i ? 1. This case will not be discussed further in this paper.
In the sequel, consider a cyclic group G = hgi and any single prime divisor p of jGj, i.e., let jGj = p h where gcd(p; h) = 1. For instance, jGj may be given by (1) where p = p i and e i = 1 for some i. Let a 2 G with a = g x be given and consider the problem of computing x modulo p, i.e., computing the unique x 0 satisfying x x 0 (mod p) (2) and 0 x 0 < p. 
Equality of logarithms modulo p can thus be tested by two exponentiations with exponent h and a comparison in the group.
For the purpose of illustration we describe our proof techniques by applying an elliptic curve over the eld F p , but it can be generalized to other groups de ned algebraically over F p such as the multiplicative group of an extension eld or certain subgroups thereof, elliptic curves over extension elds of F p or the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves of F p .
Assume now that we know the parameters A and B of a cyclic elliptic curve E A;B (F p ) over F p which is de ned as the set of points f(x; y) 2 (5) and that all orders in this range are taken on for some parameters A and B.
Furthermore, a theorem of R uck 18] implies that for each order in this interval there exists a cyclic elliptic curve. We also refer to 13] for an introduction to elliptic curves.
Very little is known about the existence of smooth numbers in the interval (5) of interest for a given prime p. However, it is known 3] that for every xed u, (n; n 1=u )=n = u ?(1+o(u))u where (n; y) denotes the number of integers n with no prime divisor y. This fact suggests that every integer n has the property P c de ned below for some c > 1.
De nition 2. An integer n has property P c if there exists an integer b satisfying n ? 2 p n + 1 b n + 2 p n + 1 with no prime divisor greater than n c=u , where u is de ned by u 2u = n.
Conjecture. There exists a constant c > 1 such that all su ciently large n have property P c .
An even stronger conjecture is that the above conjecture holds for any c > 1. For example, let n be a 100-digit number and note that 10 If p has a special form for which an elliptic curve with smooth order can be constructed e ciently, then our proof technique described below allows to prove that computing x 0 can be reduced e ciently to breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol. If p has no special form but has property P c for some small c, our proof technique allows to prove that for a general group G for which p divides jGj there exists a small xed piece of information (the elliptic curve parameters) which, when given, allows to reduce the problem of computing x 0 to breaking the Di eHellman protocol.
One can explicitly construct certain super-singular elliptic curves with known order. For example, the curves de ned over F p for p 3 (mod 4) by the equation for that quarter of the primes (namely those with p 6 1 (mod 12)) for which no appropriate super-singular elliptic curve can be obtained.
Let us assume for now that a cyclic elliptic curve E = E A;B (F p ) with smooth order T = Q r j=1 q fj j is given and that we wish to compute x 0 according to (2) where a = g x in G. Let 3 +Ax 00 +B is a quadratic residue modulo p. Let y be one of the corresponding y-coordinates, i.e., let (x 00 ; y) be a point on E. This point can be written as some multiple of the generator P of E: (x 00 ; y) = w P:
If we can determine w, then we can compute x 00 and hence x 0 because we know d. We now describe an e cient algorithm using the DH-oracle for computing w from a = g x . Note rst that we can compute g z = g x We further note that for given pairs (g u1 ; g v1 ) and (g u2 ; g v2 ), where (u 1 ; v 1 ) and (u 2 ; v 2 ) are points on E (not known explicitly), we can compute the pair (g u3 ; g v3 ) such that (u 3 ; v 3 ) = (u 1 ; v 1 ) + (u 2 ; v 2 ) on E. This is achieved by using a standard algorithm for addition on elliptic curves 13], where multiplications modulo p are replaced by calls to the DH-oracle. Note that u 1 ; v 1 ; u 2 and v 2 need not be, and that u 3 and v 3 generally will not be, in reduced form modulo p. If the points on E are represented in a ne coordinates as shown here, one such hidden elliptic curve addition requires O(log p) calls to the DH-oracle. However, if the points on E are represented in projective coordinates, only a constant number of oracle calls are needed. The conversion from projective to a ne coordinates requires O(log p) oracle calls.
In order to compute x 00 (which satis es x + d x 00 (mod p)) we compute w de ned by (6) where y is such that (x + d; y) is a point on E (see above). Let w jk for 1 j r and 0 k < f j be de ned uniquely by 0 w jk < q j and w fj?1 X k=0 w jk q k j (mod q fj j ):
The number w can easily be computed from the w jk 's using the Chinese remainder theorem.
Consider a speci c j for which we wish to determine w j0 ; : : : ; w j;fj?1 . We have T q j w T q j w j0 (mod T) and therefore (u 0 ; v 0 ) := T q j (x 00 ; y) = T q j w P = T q j w j0 P on E. We can thus compute (g u 0 ; g v 0 ) from (g x 00 ; g y ) by using O(log p) oracle calls (for projective coordinates, O(log 2 p) for a ne coordinates). Using \nor-mal" group operations we can now compute (g hu 0 ; g hv 0 ). We further compute (g hu 00 t ; g hv 00 t ) for t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, where (u 00 t ; v 00 t ) = T q j t P on E, using normal operations in G, and compare the pairs (g hu 00 t ; g hv 00 t ) and (g hu 0 ; g hv 0 ) as suggested by (3), until a match is found for some t, which is set equal to w j0 . Note that t < q j , that is at most q j trials are needed. The numbers w jm for m 1 can be computed by a generalization of the described method. This allows to prove the following theorem. Corollary 2. For groups whose order is such that for every p i one can construct an elliptic curve according to Theorem 1 (or another cyclic group with smooth order de ned algebraically over F pi ), breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms. Among these groups are those for which either p i ? 1 or p i + 1 is smooth for all i. Corollary 3. If the stated number-theoretic conjecture is true, then for every group G = hgi with known order jGj there exists a side information string S of length at most 2 log jGj such that when given S, breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol for G and base g is polynomial-time equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in G to the base g. If jGj contains multiple prime factors greater than (log jGj) k for some xed k, then the equivalence only holds with respect to breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol for certain subgroups of G.
Remarks.
(1) The string S consists of appropriate elliptic curve parameters for all prime divisors of jGj. It need not be assumed in Corollary 3 that jGj be known because it can also be computed from S. Note that the order of G and its factorization are known in many proposed cryptographic applications. In fact, it is often suggested to use a group (or subgroup) of prime order.
(2) When the order of G is not known, it is conceivable that giving jGj could be of some help in computing discrete logarithms in G. However, in those cases where jGj is known, there seems to be no reason to believe that knowledge of S could reduce the di culty of the discrete logarithm problem, but this has not been proved.
Concluding remarks
Let p be a prime factor of jGj. The proof technique presented in this paper applies to any cyclic group F (with generator f) with smooth order which is de ned algebraically over F p and whose elements are represented by vectors over F p , provided it is possible to determine (by an algebraic computation) explicitly an element of F when the value of one of the coordinates is xed. The idea is to assign to this coordinate the (hidden) logarithm x implicitly given by g x and to perform a computation using the DH-oracle to obtain the hidden values of the other coordinates. This results in the disguised version of an element P of F. The next step is to compute certain powers of f (in disguised form) using normal group operations in G, and to compare this disguised element of F with another disguised element of F obtained from P by calls to the DH-oracle. These tests allow to compute explicitly the logarithm w of P (in F) to the base f. Given w and f we can explicitly compute the group element containing x as one of the coordinates. Examples considered in this paper were the multiplicative group of F p proposed initially in 4] and elliptic curves over F p . The equivalence holds in a strict sense (without side information S) only if the group F with smooth order can be constructed explicitly.
It is conceivable that the application of hyperelliptic curves or some higherdegree Abelian varieties could allow to remove the plausible but unproven numbertheoretic assumption from Theorem 3 because the relative sizes of the corresponding intervals for the orders of the groups are much larger than for elliptic curves. This would be similar to the generalization of the Goldwasser-Kilian elliptic curve primality test 7] to hyperelliptic curves 1], which allowed to settle the last unproven details in 7] and resulted in the rst rigorously proven polynomial-time primality test.
Corollary 2 implies that if one could explicitly construct elliptic curves with smooth order for a given prime, then breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol would be equivalent to computing discrete logarithms for all groups, without side information S. However, because the solution of the same problem for composite moduli would immediately yield an e cient factoring algorithm based on 8], it appears quite unlikely that this problem can be solved e ciently for prime moduli.
The results of this paper suggest to construct groups of prime order p for use in the Di e-Hellman protocol in a manner that an explicit group (de ned modulo p) with smooth order is known. Note that the description of the group need not be published but only built into the system design in a secret manner.
However, it appears questionable whether using a group G with prime order jGj = p such that p ? 1 or p + 1 is smooth is a good idea, although no e cient discrete logarithm algorithms are known in this case. To nd such an algorithm is suggested as an open problem.
